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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 11-1264 
___________ 
 
 
In Re: MICHELE M. SIMMSPARRIS 
 
 
_______________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
D.C. Miscellaneous No. 10-mc-00115 
(Honorable Robert B. Kugler) 
______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 13, 2011 
 
Before:  SLOVITER, SCIRICA and SMITH, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: October 6, 2011) 
_________________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________________ 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
Michele M. SimmsParris appeals from an order suspending her from the practice 
of law in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey.  
On April 14, 2010, the New Jersey Office of Attorney Ethics submitted a petition 
for emergent relief to the Supreme Court of New Jersey seeking the temporary 
suspension of SimmsParris from the practice of law. The Office submitted evidence 
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demonstrating that SimmsParris had misappropriated client funds, refused to submit 
client files during its misconduct investigation, made misrepresentations to the court, and 
refused to submit to the jurisdiction of the court. On May 4th, 2010, the Supreme Court 
of New Jersey issued an order temporarily suspending SimmsParris from the practice of 
law, restraining the disbursement of funds in her trust and business accounts, and 
requiring the transfer of those funds to the Clerk of the Supreme Court. A copy of the 
Order was filed with the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey on 
June 14, 2010. 
The District Court responded on December 7, 2010, by issuing an order to show 
cause why SimmsParris should not be suspended from the practice of law before the 
District Court. On January 5, 2011, after reviewing Appellant’s written submissions, the 
court ordered SimmsParris temporarily suspended.  
In reciprocal disciplinary proceedings, district courts review the state record “for 
consistency with the requirements of due process, adequacy of proof and absence of any 
indication that imposing discipline would result in grave injustice.” In re Surrick, 338 
F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting In re Jacobs, 44 F.3d 84, 88 (2d Cir. 1994)). The 
attorney subject to discipline bears the burden of demonstrating “by clear and convincing 
evidence” the presence of a serious infirmity in the state proceeding. Id. at 232 (quoting 
In re Kramer, 282 F.3d 721, 724-25 (9th Cir.2002)). “We review district courts’ 
decisions regarding the regulation of attorneys who appear before them for abuse of 
discretion.” Id. at 229 (citation omitted).  
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SimmsParris’s principal claim is that she was never the subject of a state 
disciplinary proceeding. Accordingly, she argues, the District Court could not possibly 
have reviewed state disciplinary proceedings for a serious infirmity.1
Appellant’s claim lacks merit. Under the New Jersey Rules of Court, a temporary 
suspension is permissible where an attorney fails to cooperate with an ethics 
investigation, R. 1:20-3(g)(4), or an attorney’s conduct poses a substantial threat of 
serious harm to an attorney, a client, or the public. R. 1:20-11(a). The temporary 
suspension proceeding is initiated in a motion filed by the Office of Attorney Ethics. R. 
1:20-3(g)(4); R. 1:20-11(b). Upon review of the evidence submitted in support of this 
motion and rebuttal evidence, if any, the Supreme Court may issue an order temporarily 
suspending the attorney, pending final disposition of a disciplinary proceeding or further 
order of the court. R. 1:20-3(g)(4); R. 1:20-11(c). Here, both the motion initiating the 
disciplinary proceeding with supporting evidence and the Supreme Court’s Order of 
  
                                              
1 SimmsParris has advanced this argument elsewhere without success. In an action for 
injunctive relief and monetary damages against the New Jersey officials involved in her 
temporary suspension, the District Court rejected SimmsParris’s argument that there was 
no disciplinary proceeding against her and abstained from hearing the matter while the 
state proceeding was ongoing. SimmsParris v. Neary, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65493 
(D.N.J. June 20, 2011); SimmsParris v. Neary, Civ. No. 10-5492 (FLW) (D.N.J Aug. 15, 
2011). And, in a lawsuit brought by SimmsParris against Amy Maldonado, her former 
partner in the now dissolved law firm of SimmsParris Maldonado Tehauno, LLP., the 
District Court found SimmsParris’s claim that she was never the subject of a disciplinary 
matter before the Supreme Court of New Jersey “wholly lacks merit.” SimmsParris v. 
Maldonado, Civ. No. 10-4395 (FSH) (PS) (D.N.J. Sept. 14, 2011). It is worth noting that 
in Maldonado the District Court dismissed SimmsParris’s complaint with prejudice for a 
“pattern of misconduct . . . similar to the conduct which led to her suspensions,” 
including her failure to comply with court orders requiring her to produce documents and 
failure to appear at a hearing regarding her repeated discovery violations. SimmsParris v. 
Maldonado, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70679 (D.N.J. June 29, 2011).  
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temporary suspension for failure to cooperate with the ethics investigation were in the 
record. Accordingly, appellant’s central contention—that there was no record of a 
disciplinary proceeding for the District Court to review—is incorrect. The District Court 
properly carried out its role in reviewing the state court proceeding.2
Indeed, the record supports the District Court’s conclusion that SimmsParris failed 
to establish serious infirmities in the state proceeding. SimmsParris contends the state 
deprived her of due process by providing inadequate notice and failing to hold a hearing 
regarding her temporary suspension. But the Office of Attorney Ethics served the 
disciplinary petition at an office address—which the record shows she used at least until 
2009—and her home address.
 
3
                                              
2 SimmsParris suggests that the District Court violated due process in failing to hold a 
hearing. But the requirements of due process were satisfied when the court issued its 
Order to Show Cause and conducted an independent review of the record. See, e.g., In re 
Surrick, 338 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2003); In re Kramer, 193 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir. 1999). 
She further claims the local procedural rules required the court to notify her of the date 
and time of a hearing. But that requirement only applies “[i]f oral argument is to be 
heard.” D.N.J. L. Civ. R. 78.1(b). SimmsParris did not request oral argument and no oral 
argument was ordered by the court.  
 That SimmsParris shows a third address where she 
received correspondence from the Office does not establish deficient notice. Likewise, 
SimmsParris fails to demonstrate that the lack of a hearing regarding her interim 
suspension amounts to a due process violation. Here, the temporary suspension was 
issued because SimmsParris did not cooperate in an ongoing ethics investigation. An 
interim suspension of a professional license pending final disposition does not require a 
pre-suspension hearing. See Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 65-66 (1979). The record does 
3 We note SimmsParris submitted only the first page of a letter in which the Office 
describes its efforts to notify her of the petition for temporary suspension.  
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not establish that SimmsParris sought a hearing in the ongoing state disciplinary 
proceedings. Instead of participating in those proceedings, SimmsParris filed a motion in 
the Supreme Court of New Jersey disparaging the deputy ethics counsel who filed the 
petition for temporary suspension and asking the court to vacate its suspension Order.    
Finally, SimmsParris contends the District Court did not follow its own local 
procedural rules when it failed to include a copy of the state disciplinary Order with its 
Order to Show Cause and failed to designate thirty days from the day of service for her 
response. See D.N.J. L. Civ. R. 104.1(b)(2). Even if it was error, any deviation from the 
local District rules was harmless. SimmsParris had ample notice of the basis for the 
District Court’s proceedings against her. The District Court found SimmsParris had 
notice of the New Jersey temporary suspension at least six months before it issued its 
Order to Show Cause. Moreover, the District Court’s Order to Show Cause specifically 
referred to the temporary suspension Order of the Supreme Court of New Jersey. 
Similarly, SimmsParris was not prejudiced by the District Court’s failure to designate 
thirty days to respond. In a footnote to her timely response, SimmsParris noted this 
deviation from the local District rules but did not request more time nor suggest that 
additional time would have altered her response.  
We conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in imposing 
reciprocal discipline. 
